![]() No information is publically available thus far to confirm North Korea’s claims that the September 28 launch successfully demonstrated an HGV. Takeaway One: Much Remains Unknown or Unconfirmed The launch also makes good on Kim Jong Un’s inclusion of hypersonic missile development in his speech to the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, making it likely that other technologies he mentioned (such as solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles) will be rolled out in the future.įinally, we should not ignore the substantial political objectives North Korea had in making this announcement, seeking to bolster deterrence, trumpet its technological prowess, generate prestige and legitimacy, and underscore the foresight and accomplishments of the regime. More significant, the North foreshadowed “turning all missile fuel systems into ampoules,” suggesting it intends to continue to retain and improve its liquid-propellant ballistic missile force for the long term rather than shift to an all-solid force. In fact, those benefits come instead from the use of storable liquid propellants (that can remain in missiles for long periods of time without damaging them, unlike previous propellants), although “ampoulization” could provide easier and safer missile handling. Many have pointed to this as a signal of improvement in the survivability and operational utility of North Korean liquid-propellant missiles. The “Hwasong-8” was reported to use a “missile fuel ampoule,” the meaning of which is unclear but probably refers to loading the missile with propellants at the factory. If the North intends to deploy credible HGVs, at least a few successful and longer-range tests will be needed, probably taking at least a few years. ![]() An HGV would only make a niche contribution to the North’s existing large ballistic missile force, however, primarily in providing another option to evade missile defenses. Many pertinent aspects of the launch currently are unknown, including the success of the test and the accuracy and intended payload of the HGV. Atop the rocket was an arrowhead-shaped vehicle with stubby wings resembling a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), the reentry portion of a ballistic missile-based “hypersonic missile.” On October 12, the North released photos from Kim Jong Un’s attendance the previous day at the opening of “The Defense Development Exhibition Self-Defense 2021,” showing the “Hwasong-8” on a road-mobile launcher with a booster smaller than the Hwasong-12 and an HGV payload strongly resembling that used on the Chinese DF-17 missile. On September 29, North Korea announced the previous day’s launch of “a hypersonic missile Hwasong-8.” It also released a photograph showing a liquid-propellant rocket resembling a shortened version of the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in the early stages of flight.
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